On the Will to Cut Expenditures

Who said, “The plan is to reduce the cost of Federal government operations by 25 per cent”?

Or, “We should plan to have a definitely balanced budget for the third year of recovery and from that time on seek a continuing reduction of the national debt”?

How about, “The Treasury is all right and we are balancing the budget — you needn’t worry”?

Or, finally, “It has taken courage for the Federal government to go into the ‘red’…But it has been worth it”?

If you guessed “Calvin Coolidge,” you would be wrong. It was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, between 1932 and 1938. As Bruce Barton pointed out, however, there was no further talk of economy after 1938. “The talk was about the preparation for war and, later, about the fine new world the war was going to usher in.”

Bruce Barton, whose 1953 article, "Unless It Hurts, It's No Good," is featured here.

Bruce Barton, whose 1953 article, “Unless It Hurts, It’s No Good,” is featured here.

Not only had 1931 seen the first budget deficit in twelve years, the debt stood at $21 billion by January 1933. When Roosevelt died in April 1945, the debt had ballooned to $233 billion. President Truman built upon that infamous legacy with another $32 billion of his own. Writing as a new President was taking office in 1953, Bruce Barton hastened to the point of his article: “Both of these presidents talked economy, but neither of them had any real heart for it. Neither of them was willing to do anything that would endanger the support of a pressure group in the next campaign.” Both were pandering to people, telling voters what they wanted to hear but never delivering anything more than eloquent words and good intentions. When the occasion called for it, the cuts promised in the heat of campaigns were too politically painful to make, risked the alienation of some support group somewhere and endangered electoral success in the future. They cared too much for the appearances and not enough for the substantial harm inflicted on people by the curtailment of growth and opportunity because of Government’s limitless spending habits. It is a lack of discipline, not bravery, that Government demonstrates when spending more than it has. Saying one thing and doing another, especially when one is the President of the United States, does not illustrate courage either, it exemplifies cowardice.

In contrast, Barton continues, “Calvin Coolidge cut the debt of his day by nearly 25 per cent. To disparage him is now the fashion. He is slurred over as a ‘do-nothing’ president, a national nonentity. Actually he was all guts.”

Before you snicker and chortle, dear reader, consider carefully Barton’s four examples substantiating that claim.

1. “As governor, he had the guts to break the Boston police strike. When Samuel Gompers, the country’s most powerful labor leader, demanded that the striking policemen be reinstated, Coolidge wired: ‘There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, at any time.’ ” While it has often been incorrectly asserted that the danger had already passed and that Governor Coolidge took credit for something he did not do, this telegram might never have been sent and so cogently framed the heart of the issue had Coolidge not sent it. He was not the politician who runs from confrontation.

2. “He had the guts to veto the act passed by the members of both Houses of the Legislature raising their own salaries.” The veto, just like the telegram, did not have to be sent. Governor Coolidge could have joined the General Court that spring of 1919 with a wink and a nod, signing their $500 increase and saying nothing. Like trimming down state agencies from 120 to 19 departments, however, Governor Coolidge refused to simply “punt” difficult tasks to his successor, even when the law allowed for delay.

3. “As president, he had the guts to veto the first big farm subsidy, the McNary-Haugen Bill, on the grounds that the bill was not only an abuse of the taxing power, but also a sure path to overproduction.” The sharp language of both veto messages took everyone by surprise at the time, who considered Coolidge incapable of being riled about anything. He took on the issue firmly and ended attempts at government control of agriculture for the rest of his term. This is all the more incredible considering that two solid Republicans sponsored the bill, a large majority passed it twice and a very influential “Farm Bloc” wanted it to be law.

4. “He also killed the excessive soldiers’ bonus, since the veterans had already received a discharge bonus of 256 million dollars. Coolidge’s friends and foes agreed in predicting that such actions would kill him politically; yet the people gave him overwhelming re-election.” This, too, is stunning when, as it seems today, there is no price too high for veteran’s benefits.

Barton comes to the point, as America still stood at war-time levels of spending: it was time to reapply Coolidge’s courage, not merely echo the same empty words and pleasing promises. “History should teach us that you can’t slash without incurring the opposition of powerful pressure groups. That unless the slash hurts it isn’t any good.”

Coolidge put it this way, “Nothing is easier than spending the public money. It does not appear to belong to anybody. The temptation is overwhelming to bestow it on somebody.” Yet, ninety years ago, a reserved but courageous man from Vermont triumphed over that temptation, overcoming it not merely once or twice but repeatedly and consistently.

The Coolidges, among the crowd, at Salem train depot.

The Coolidges, among the crowd, at Salem, MA, train depot.

“I don’t think in all my experience, which has been very large…with proposals for spending money, I have ever had any proposal from anyone as to what could be done to save any money. Sometimes linked with the proposal for an immediate large expenditure is the suggestion that it ultimately will result in a saving…[T]hat is about the extent of the outside assistance I have had in that direction” — December 14, 1928.

“The appropriation of public money always is perfectly lovely until some one is asked to pay the bill. if we are to have a billion dollars of navy, half a billion of farm relief, four hundred millions of Mississippi flood control, two or three hundred millions of river and harbor improvements, two or three hundred millions of public buildings, hundreds of millions of good roads and other hundreds of millions of pensions, the people will have to furnish more revenue by paying more taxes. It is for them, through their Congress, to decide how far they wish to go” — August 4, 1930.

On Accounting for Coolidge Popularity

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It may come as a surprise that a coterie of critics, some members of the press and even a Party establishment existed in Coolidge’s day. They were hostile to the notion that one not of their number, lacking in sophistication or elite pedigree, could attain to the Presidency. Taken together they are what Charles Willis Thompson called, “The Intellectuals.” It is no different now for anyone with the courage and common sense to run for elective office independent of and without approval from the self-appointed political and cultural establishment. The Intellectuals had to reckon with Coolidge’s genuine and immense popularity. Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican Senator of Massachusetts, when told that Coolidge was being considered by some to lead the national ticket in 1920, sneered, “Nominate a man who lives in a two-family? Never!”

The fact that Coolidge, from his earliest years in state politics, consistently garnered more votes than any other Republican did. It was no secret that he secured more votes as Lieutenant Governor than his partner, Governor McCall, in the 1916 race. Even as the state went Democrat and Republicans lost their seats, Coolidge kept winning by greater and greater margins. “The Intellectuals,” chagrined at each electoral success, could not believe he was capable of winning the next time. Yet, win he did. In the presidential election of 1924, the man they had dismissed as a lightweight, local fad whom they would easily discard, perhaps along with Harding, went on to surpass challengers, secure a unanimous nomination and win an unprecedented landslide of 15.7 million voters in a three-way campaign, achieving what conventional wisdom said could never be done, especially after the outcome of 1912.

The Party elites had a clear champion in their midst but rather than rally to him, they maintained their skeptical alienation. He was not of them and never would be. Of course, he held an unshakable belief in party loyalty, not to simply secure office for himself or others but to advance principles he knew were right and tested true by human experience. The “secret” to his success lay not in the path of expediency, watering himself down to match what made him “electable” in the eyes of the “experts.” He required no pollster, no consultant, no speech writer to tell him what to believe. Decades before “Reagan Democrats,” the hard-working, patriotic, religious, “blue-collar” family men of manufacturing, service and industry were “Coolidge Democrats.” He earned their trust not through threats, manipulation, calculated promises, misinformation, pandering or even back-door dealing. His recipe for such stunning success, a genuine popularity and political success held all his life, was due to two simple qualities: “Simple words and straightforward acts” comprised Coolidge’s “magic” (Thompson, Presidents I’ve Known and Two Near Presidents, p.354). “The Intellectuals” never understood this. In the end, even as Coolidge walked away from office and continued to enjoy a level of popularity very few former Presidents have, the elites blamed it on the stupidity and simplicity of the American “masses.”

Thompson explained in 1929,

“As for the Mystery of 1924–the mystery of his election by a tremendous majority when so many towering geniuses had demonstrated that he hadn’t a chance–that too, was psychological. He was elected on that day in 1923 when he sent his first message to Congress. The country had heard language for many years. The unceasing, all-embracing sea of it had swollen until it reached high tide under Wilson…The country was apathetically resigned to a permanent government by language.

“Therefore, the first official word it heard from Coolidge was sensational. Not only was there no purple in the message, but there was no ratiocination, no argument, no stock official phrases. He told Congress what he thought would be for the good of the country and told it as briefly as he could. One of the things it wanted was economy. The burning question of that day, the soldier’s bonus, he treated in a single sentence, merely saying he was opposed to it; this at a time when the conventional attitude for politicians on the bonus question was astride the fence.

“The country rubbed its eyes. Here was a President of an entirely new kind. The country waited long enough to see if Coolidge meant what he said. He had just one session of Congress to prove it in. He did. Throughout that session he worked hard to get Congress to carry out the recommendations he had made…The country liked him immensely; it did after he had been President only a year…It liked Coolidge in 1923; it even made up its mind definitely that he was the kind of President it wanted. His first message to Congress fixed his popularity, and it increased until, to the astonishment of the politicians, they had to nominate him in obedience to a popular demand they did not understand and could not account for” (Thompson p.357).

Presidential Election of 1924 by county, showing Coolidge's very impressive support across the country. Securing 54% of the popular and 382 electoral votes to 136 (for Democrat Davis) and 13 (for Progressive La Follette), Coolidge shattered the conventional wisdom that he was both "unelectable" beyond Massachusetts and incapable of prevailing in a three-way race nationally. No one has ever done that before or since without throwing the election into the House (1824) or losing to the Democrat opponent (1912, 1992).

Presidential Election of 1924 by county, showing Coolidge’s very impressive support across the country. Securing 54% of the popular vote (15, 723,789 of 29 million votes cast) and 382 electoral votes (35 of 48 states, 71.9% of 531 electoral votes) to 136 (for Democrat Davis) and 13 (for Progressive La Follette), Coolidge shattered the conventional wisdom that he was both “unelectable” beyond Massachusetts and incapable of prevailing in a three-way race nationally. He even continued, as had begun in 1920, breaking  into the supposedly monolithic counties of the Democrat “Solid South” as well as the supposedly un-winnable Progressive West. No one has ever overwhelmed a Third Party challenge and a Democrat bloc before or since without throwing the election into the House (1824) or losing to the Democrats (1912, 1992).

Just as is the case now, the “talking heads” of media networks, the establishment of Party politics, and many of the gatekeepers of cultural trends revealed their utter insensibility to what Americans understood and felt about the country and its future. This institutionalized tone deafness swept them aside in 1924 and the foundations are already in place to do it again in the Congressional races of 2014. The “silent majority” of American politics led their leaders in 1924, and that same process is poised to happen again. Coolidge saw this as a vindication of the people’s sovereignty over their government. He was not threatened, as some are, by such an event. Coolidge would not even name a Vice President, leaving the delegates to make that decision, saying with a sparkle in his eye, “It did in 1920 and it picked a durned good man.”

Thompson continues,

“Throughout that campaign the Intellectuals were confident that even so stupid an electorate as the American one could not elect such a poor boob as Coolidge, and they never did account for the avalanche which swept him into office. Senator La Follette did emerge from under the avalanche long enough to offer a sort of explanation; he intimated that the sixteen millions who voted for Coolidge were bought up, and self-sacrificingly promised to go on working for the interest of these corrupted ‘masses’; but the Intellectuals didn’t accept that explanation, and finally concluded that it was just another proof of the incorrigible wrong-headedness of the electorate, or, as H. L. Mencken calls it, the ‘booberie’ ” (Thompson p.357).

The same effort by the elites to make sense of the current American groundswell of opposition to the direction its “leaders” are taking the country will follow much the same route, whether the issue be Chris Christie for President or new green cards for the nearly 12 million illegals living in the country. In the end, these elites will not acknowledge their deficiencies of vision or their failures to deserve leadership, they will blame the American voter for being too dumb to understand who and what is good for the country. The challenges we face, and they are supremely daunting, heading into these next two years will require the utmost involvement from the American people to become informed, take up their sovereign duty as participants not merely spectators in politics and perpetuate the republican ideals the Founders presciently secured. They did so not merely for themselves but for us and our children. Staying at home as so many did in 2012 ultimately hurts ourselves and the future of the country. Teaching the establishment a lesson by abstaining from our solemn duty to vote never reaches its intended purpose any more than is surrendering our dual system for a Third Party in 2016.

We simply need to better exercise our power to choose qualified leaders at the primaries, replacing those unfit for public trust. As Coolidge reminds us, our destiny rests in our own hands at the ballot box. If we shirk it there, we have no place to protest the stripping of our freedoms after the election by those we have directly or indirectly sustained in power. That is how serious the vote remains this year, of all years. The ideals the Founders fought to establish, held by subsequent leaders like Calvin Coolidge, are perpetuated not through the choice of an elite few, but through the determined will of an engaged American people.

Book Discussion on “Coolidge: An American Enigma,” August 11, 1998

http://c-spanvideo.org/program/Enig

A superb presentation by the late, but great, Mr. Robert Sobel on Calvin Coolidge. While not a recent work, it is a fresh contribution to respect and appreciate the thirtieth president even now. It was my first read on Mr. Coolidge. Scholar Sobel presents him as he was, without apology, without pretense, without facade.

Though Mr. Coolidge may finally be gaining a semblance of regard for who he was and the principles he embodied, this interview, not that long ago in the grand scheme of events, reminds us that an unwarranted prejudice and close-minded suspicion has prevailed so long about Coolidge and his kind of leadership. The host’s almost awkward incredulity illustrates this engrained, yet mistaken, impression of who Coolidge was and is supposed to remain.

Sobel’s work demands that we open our minds to the profound value of Coolidge’s legacy, rejecting the utterly false perception of his weakness and ineffectiveness assumed as fact by an intellectually narrow and politically biased academia. Sobel expects us to reckon with this intricate, and even potent leader, instead of keeping our eyes closed for fear of seeing something that contradicts what we are now supposed to believe as irrefutable, politically, culturally and economically. He has much to teach us about leadership in general and the Presidency in particular. Don’t merely read the book and shelve it, take the time to study it in order to better grasp what makes Coolidge important now.

Sobel book